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Abstract
This paper presents a new end-to-end security model for interconnected
Virtual Network domains. Network Function Virtualization (NFV) has
gained wide attention among Internet Service Providers during the last years.
The standardization work from ETSI has outlined a common framework for
Network Function Virtualization, open for multiple combinations of inter-
domain communication. The communication methods consist of multiple
NFV interconnection technologies and interfaces, that open up for a variety
of NFV models and increased complexity. From an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) perspective, the ultimate goal is to be able to freely interconnect NFV
services with other ISPs in a secure and automated manner. Hence, this
paper presents an abstraction model of the current NFV end-to-end network
transport mechanisms for inter-domain communication, to model the end-to-
end security. The general work within the NFV domain is driven by multiple
research contributors where academia, standardization organizations and the
open-source community further develop the technology. To verify the model
and contribute avoiding research silos, it is also important to classify the
related research. We use the presented model for such classification of NFV
interconnection mechanisms. By categorizing the differences between the
NFV interconnection layers, we show that the model can be used to identify
the security gap for secure network channels in NFV.
1 Introduction
Network Function Virtualization is based on the concept of moving Network Functions
(NF) from distributed hardware (aka middleboxes), into centralized servers. Examples of
such functions are DHCP server, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems etc [1]. When
these functions are virtualized, moved off-site and centralized, the network traffic needs to
be redirected to the centralized servers and also redirected between multiple instances of
such functions. This paper investigates the end-to-end security of redirecting such traffic.
Security is still a major obstacle to NFV and cloud computing [2]. Network operators
in Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and enterprise networks have to ensure data privacy
and integrity to a high level. Lack of security features slows down the adoption rate
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of this technology. NFV has its origin in cloud computing where resource sharing
and multiplexing are essential for the business. An important security aspect of NFV
networking is isolating resources and the networks between customers. Lack of such
isolation brings security risks to users and operators. The ongoing NFV standardization
work shows multiple examples of how to logically separate the traffic inside an NFV
Infrastructure [3]. But, when the traffic exits the administrative domain, multiple transport
technologies (see Table 2) and types of inter-domain interfaces exist (Fig. 1). This makes
standardization and security work challenging.
This paper addresses two challenges related to NFV interconnection and end-to-end
security:
(1) Determining the types of NFV interconnection protocols that can be used in a
secure environment, as well as the way how they can be classified and how they support
network isolation and encryption.
(2) Explaining the dependency between the related protocols needed to set up the
Virtual Network Functions, and determining whether potential protocol dependency
affects the end-to-end security.
In this paper, we respond to these challenges by defining an abstract network model
of protocol relations. Then we use this model to group the different interconnection
protocols and show the dependency between the groups. The structure of the paper is
the following. In Section 2 we give a short background of the related work. In Section 3
we introduce the necessary technical details of the NFV framework and in Section 4, we
define the modelling and classification criteria of NFV interconnection methods. Then
we present a four-layered security model of interconnecting NFV networks in Section 5.
The technology classification is given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Related work
Within the research area of interconnecting NFV domains, European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) aims to lead and coordinate the work. However, private
organizations, as well as researchers from industry and academia, work in parallel or in
cooperation with ETSI. The research areas are split into research silos, which represents
the telecommunication providers, datacenters and non-telco based cloud computing
networks. The organizations that contribute to NFV interdomain communications are
summarized in Table 1. Their specific work on interconnection technologies is covered
Section 6.
Organization Type Track Contribution Description
ETSI [1] Std.org Telco. Architecture & Requirements Top level framework
5GPP [9] Std.org Telco. Architecture & Application Study mobile standardization
IETF SFC [10] Std.org Telco. Protocols & Models Service chaining and Protocols
IRTF NFVRG [11] Std.org Telco. Architecture& Requirements NFV in general
ONF [12] Std.org Datacenter Protocols & Models OpenFlow standardization
Supercloud project [13] Academia Cloud Architecture & Requirements Self service and end-to-end security
CleanSky ITN [14] Academia Cloud Architecture & Requirements Datacenter consolidation
Mobile Cloud Netw. [15] Academia All Architecture & Requirements Datacenter for mobile networks
UNIFY [16] Academia Telco. Architecture & Requirements Unified NFV Platform
T-NOVA [17] Academia All Architecture & Requirements Open Network & business with NFV
OpenStack [18] Open Source Cloud Solutions OpenStackAPI for distributed NFV
OpenDaylight [19] Open Source Datacenter Solutions SDN platform with NFV solutions
OPNNFV [20] Open Source Telco. Solutions OpenStack platform with NFV
Table 1: Related research
3 The NFV Framework
In 2012 a group of seven telecommunication operators called for research action of
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and selected the ETSI to be the home of the
specification. By 2016, 290 companies, including 38 of the world’s leading telco
operators have joined the research group. ETSI aims to produce requirements and
specification guidelines. They have published 40 documents so far, of which 7 are related
to security [4] and 5 are related to network interconnection architecture [5]. One of the
Figure 1: The ETSI model simplified [5]
objectives of ETSI NFV is to separate the virtualized network functions from the physical
infrastructure and management. Hence, the ETSI NFV architecture consists of three key
components [5] :
• Virtal Network Functions (VNF) - The instances of virtualized machines
• NFV Infrastructure (NFVI/NVI) - The physical and virtual infrastructure
• NFV management and orchestration. (NFV MANO) - Management and control
of NFV
NFV brings together different industries, where each of them has their separate
specifications and techniques. The NFV architecture aims to create functional blocks
with interfaces to create a reference model for NVI. Hence, the ETSI models are closer
to a reference model than to a protocol specification. Yet they lack information about
secure channels and dependency between the components. Recently, ETSI has published
documents related to reliability in order to show dependencies [6], but the dependencies
with respect to end-to-end security have they not considered.
4 Modelling and classification criteria
We here define the deficiencies in the current ETSI model related to interconnecting NFV
domains. These deficiencies are the basis for the attributes and classifiers in our new
model. This section gives a background for these classification criteria.
Location of Network Control: Regarding network interconnections, the ETSI model
does not specify where to run the network control. ETSI has proposed to run Software
Defined Network control either in a VNF, in the Network Infrastructure domain or in
the Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM) [7]. This implies that the ETSI model is open
for multiple combinations of inter-domain communication. It is considered that network
control intercommunication dependencies are not modelled by ETSI.
Network Service Chaining dependencies: According to ETSI, a Network Service is
a collection of Network Functions that defines the end-to-end behaviour and forwarding
paths of the Network Functions [8]. An important goal of ETSI NFV is that these
forwarding paths and Network Functions are dynamically created and traffic is routed
across multiple networks automatically. This means that a customer can have chained
network services from multiple service providers, that are transparent to the end user.
The Management and Orchestration document [8] describes the attributes of chained
network services with Virtual Links and how they can be abstracted. Abstractions of
end-to-end security dependencies between multiple Virtual Links are not contained in the
ETSI documents.
Security dependencies between protocols: ETSI has stated many security
challenges related to NFV [2], but only one document[4] discusses the security challenges
of interconnecting NFV domains. [4] is a trust and topology guidance. It does not
investigate relations between NFV interconnections with respect to security levels. We
claim that the end-to-end security requirements in different topologies will be different
depending on the type of communication channels between NFV components (VNFC).
The reason for this, is that each NFV interface should be secured and relations between
them should be modelled. This is close to the protocol relation between IP forwarding and
IP routing. End-user data-plane traffic (VNF-VNF) communicates on a different channel
than control-plane traffic (VNFC-VNFC). The data-plane traffic flow is dependent on
the management layer to configure and establish the data path. Hence, a separation of
communication layers and a model of their dependencies are needed. For example: a
security breach in network control or key distribution systems also invalidates the end-to-
end security in end user traffic.
Traffic isolation: A key problem in virtualizing a network is that a channel is not
secure if it is not end-to-end and implicitly shared. When virtualizing networks, multiple
Figure 2: Virtualized network
overlay networks are created (Fig. 2). A typical solution is to create one secure channel
between every NFV domain. This channel is referred to as the Virtual Link, and can
potentially include management traffic as well as end-user traffic between the domains.
Hence, the channel integrity is only ensured from outside of the NFV domains. One
expected future scenario is that NFV will be widely adopted where most Internet Service
Providers run interconnected NFV; if everyone has joined the NFV VPN, then the NFV
network is considered as open and shared. Additional secure channels will therefore be
needed. These channels must be secured and isolated on an individual level.
5 A security model of interconnecting NFV networks
To categorize the different methods to interconnect domains, this paper presents a four-
layered model. The model reflects four types of communication channels between
NFV domains. It shows that the communication channels depend on each other and
that they represent different levels of network abstraction. The network transport (1)
Figure 3: The Network Abstraction Stack
is the low-level end-users communication flow between VNFs. The network control
layer (2) handles topology and routing information. These need to be exchanged for
the transport layer to work. The Service Management layer (3) is an abstraction of the
communication needed to instantiate VNFs and Service Chains (SC) [8]; it is dependent
on network control. The NFV domain layer (4) manifests a new contractual top-level end-
to-end interconnection interface between NFV operators. The lower layer communication
channels have one upper layer dependency, while one upper layer communication channel
is responsible for multiple lower layer communication channels. For example, a network
control channel can be used to configure multiple datapaths, while a specific datapath must
be controlled by one master controller. The presented model reflects the fact that a security
breach in the communication on the upper layers also invalidates the secure channels of
all the underlying layers. Hence, end-to-end security has a new vertical aspect in addition
to traditional horizontal end-to-end security (Fig. 3). Therefore, this dependency must
[21] be validated for every layer. (see Section 6)
It is possible to add additional underlying layers to represent the physical
infrastructure, or to add additional middle-layers to represent multiple levels of service
abstractions. The presented model does not make any restrictions in the number of layers.
It uses four layers to simplify the protocol classification and to symbolize the hierarchy
and the chain of dependencies in the horizontal and the vertical axes.
Security Association topologies
ETSI suggests a trust guidance [4] between the NFV components, but they do not have
a model of trust dependencies between the NFV components. Trust is highly dynamic
and a security framework with dynamic trust relationships must be defined. This paper
suggests using the presented model to show the relationships in trust dynamics. Trust
is the confidence and the reliance in the integrity of a remote entity and it is often a
human decision made on an abstract level [22]. This abstract confidence in trust makes
the network abstraction model suitable for modelling trust.
The model (Fig. 3) shows multiple layers of communication that are dependent on
each other. All the layers represent different security levels and implicit trust levels. This
leads to a vertical chain of trusts between the layers. Correspondingly, the communication
between the ISP domains shows the horizontal chain of trust (i.e when a VNF traverses
multiple ISP domains). In a chain of trust, a root of trust must be defined. ETSI has
suggested that the originating VNF should have the root of trust [4]. This suggestion does
not fit the model, and we claim that the root of trust must be redefined. This is because
the trust of the VNF is defined before the instantiation of the VNF on the very top-level
of the network abstraction stack. Then, after the VNF instantiation, the originating VNF
can create consecutive trust relations with other VNFs.
This paper defines horizontal and vertical trust relations as Security Associations
(SAs) similar to IKE [23] and X.509 [24] relations. The SAs are used to establish the
secure channels. To ensure end-to-end security between multiple channels, our model
shows that a hierarchy of SAs is needed. The root of trust is defined as the top-level SA.
Different NFV topologies make multiple combinations of the vertical and the
horizontal SA axes and create multiple abstract network topologies. A common topology
is a federated NFV network. A federated model implies that there is a master component
in the model, which controls multiple subordinate components. This does not change
the SAs in the security model, but it shows that one upper layer can have multiple SAs
in subordinate layers. In federated hierarchies, sub-domains do not need to implement
the whole abstraction stack. However, in an ISP inter-domain communication model all
the layers will be present. In a federated sub-domain model with smaller number of
abstraction layers, the highest layer in each sub-domain possesses the domain specific
top-level SA (Fig. 4).
Figure 4: Interconnections to federated models
Figure 5: Intermediate model with trust Figure 6: Multiple paths intermediate model
An intermediate model differs from a federated model. In an intermediate model, an
interconnected system answers on the behalf of another interconnected system. Since
the trust and security requirements differ between ISP domains, it is not possible to make
horizontal trust chains without defining the end points. An intermediate model requires an
additional horizontal end-to-end channel of trust. Without end-to-end SAs, it is assumed
that a channel is not sufficiently secured. However the network abstraction model opens
up for trusted end-to-end connections as long as the highest level of abstraction has a
horizontal end-to-end SA between them. The underlying layers can therefore trust the
top-level SA. For the intermediate operator, a top-level one-to-one SA is needed from
the origin ISP (Fig. 5). The distribution of the SAs is considered to be connected to
the Service Graphs [25]. The Service Graph sets up the chain and the forwarding paths
between the VNFs at the origin ISP. This ISP can also set up the corresponding SAs
in a similar manner. This also opens up for the Service Graphs to use SA attributes
in the forwarding path calculations. This allows the ISPs to define requirements and
policies about secure paths, which ensures VNF integrity and confidentiality when the
traffic traverses intermediate networks.
The intermediate models show the importance of secure channels, security chains
and horizontal trust. Autonomous Systems of ISPs have multiple interconnection paths
where a traffic path can alter between many different transit ISPs (Fig. 6). It is expected
that some ISPs will have support for network control interaction and others will not.
Therefore, the configuration of a path depends on the network transport (i.e tunnels or
flows) and the network control (i.e. SDN or MPLS SR/PCEP). These technologies are
discussed in the next section.
6 Model classification
It is expected that an implementation of the model can be established through a policy
framework and supported protocols. But, most importantly, the real life technologies need
to be verified with respect to where and how they fit into the model and how they support
isolation and encryption with SA dependencies. Hence, a technology classification is
needed for each layer.
Network Transport
The network transport layer is the first level of abstraction. A requirement for NFV to
work, is that a virtual network between the NFV domains is established. This virtual
network consists of NFV Virtual Links [8] that interconnect the NFV domains and
create a virtual network (i.e. overlay). The virtual network is created to make end-user
traffic traverse through multiple Service Providers’ NFV services, without the need of
modifying the IP addresses in the original IP packet. The transport technologies reflect the
research silos defined in Section 2. Simplified, the cloud computing network providers’
offer tunnelling and hardware virtualization(1), the telco research tries to solve this by
additional network layers(2), while the datacenter research tries to make networks based
on OSI layer two(3).
Cloud based networking: In cloud-based networks, static or dynamic tunnels
are set up between the datacenters. Typically Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) or
Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels. These tunnels are often set up between
the datacenters and additional virtual tunnelling is used inside the tunnels to separate
individual service flows. This results in two levels of virtual network transport. The
individual channels must [21] also be secured and will have a dependency to the
underlying channel. This corresponds to the network abstraction model where a higher
level of abstractions have SA dependencies upwards in the model. A challenge is that
end-to-end encryption for every channel and software based network devices require a lot
of computational power, packet overhead and the underlying datapaths are not known.
Additional layers: The key problem is that with VNF forwarding, the IP packets
cannot follow the standard routing table. A native IP packet will traverse and potentially
flow back and forth between multiple NFV service providers before it reaches the standard
Internet routing table. To reduce tunnelling overhead, the telco industry has suggested to
solve this without tunnelling, but by using advanced routing. This requires the packet
to have additional headers that the routers can base their routing on. One solution is to
use additional headers such as Network Service Headers (NSH [26]). Another solution
is to use Multiprotocol Label Switching segment routing (MPLS-SR) [27]. (1) NSH
natively (without transport tunnels) requires that the routers can read NSH headers. (2)
Segment routing has evolved from IETF source routing (SPRING) [27]. It allows the
network operator to specify a network path from ingress to egress without using a standard
interior gateway routing protocol (MPLS SR/PCEP [28]). This requires interconnected
flow control, which the standard Internet Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) tables do not
contain today. NSH is the only technology that has suggested an overlay framework for
a secure channel between the VNFs [10]. IETF has specified a requirement list for the
security extension, but it does not contain any suggestion for vertical security dependency.
Layer two interconnections: Layer two tunnelling (i.e. vlan, 802.1ad, 802.1ah,
NV-GRE, OTT, STT, VXLAN) [29] has a history of not being sufficiently secure. The
protocols do not have any encryption support natively, and need additional tunnelling for
that. In a global perspective, most of the protocols have no global address space and do
not scale very well. Federated domains are implicitly required. Security considerations
such as overwriting MACtables or MAC-to-VTEP mapping, packet insertion and packet
sniffing, also makes the protocols vulnerable in respect of end-to-end security.
Discussion: The tunnelling protocol makes interconnections with intermediate
Service Providers simple, since the end-to-end tunnelling does not require intermediates
to do more than routing the tunnel. The downside is that intermediate providers will not
be able to run security features such as mitigating DDoS or offering QoS on different
NFV flows and the MTU will in most cases be limited. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the tunnelling mechanisms are a transit technology until flow based routing, such as
segment routing [27] is supported more globally.
Network Control
The Network control layer in the abstraction model refers to the configuration of the
network. In its simplest form, it can be a human communication between two network
engineers setting up a network between them. The engineers can agree on a "Security
Association" and also configure every network flow manually. But, this is not agile and
not necessarily fault resistant.
Vertical communication: In NFV Service Chaining, control and configuration of
network flows are essential. The ability to signal an NFV traffic path, without using
standard destination routing, requires tunnels or flow-based routing.
This paper refers to Software Defined Networking (SDN) as the ability to separate the
control plane and data plane traffic. In the abstraction model, the network control layer
is responsible for control-plane traffic; the network control layer sends a control signal to
the network devices to let it forward packets based on the centralized flow table. This type
of signalling also follows three research tracks; datacenters (i.e., OpenFlow [30]), telco
(i.e., PCEP [28]) or cloud computing (i.e., OpenvSwitch tunnels [20]).
With centralized control follows the ability to control tunnel state transition, path
optimization, repolicying etc. But most importantly, SDN makes the network control
accessible through an API in the controller. This makes the network more abstract and
programmable with south-, east-west- and northbound interfaces.
Vertical communication from the controller to the network devices affects the end-to-
end security. SSL is a standard OpenFlow mechanism to establish these secure network
device control channels, but lacks a system for secure key distribution to ensure two-sides
authentication. Enhanced options such as the SNBI implementation of OpenDaylight
[19] with TPM security can help to ensure two-sides authentication, but only towards
the transport layer. No standard for a chain of trust in upwards communication has been
defined.
Horizontal communication: Interconnecting two network control domains with
respect to SDN does not have many implementations. Primarily there are three ways: (1)
making an overlay (FORCES, ALTO, CDNi, I2RS) [30], (2) using an east-west interface
( i.e. SDNi[19] ) or (3) making a specific protocol (i.e. NSH [26]). East-west interfaces
and overlays [19] give a remote peer access to control the whole network. This can be
granulated by fine-grained access control, but is difficult to maintain. East-west interfaces
also require a distribution of data and states of flows between the operators, that however
do not scale. SDN partitioning [31] research has tried to solve the amount of shared
resources needed for SDNi [19], but it has resulted in complex access control and policy
lists, that are difficult to operate. Network Service Header signalling has the potential
of being scalable, but the instantiation of the tunnel is not specified, other than that it
belongs to the network control layer ( i.e. OpenFlow, PCRF, Netconf/yang , custom)
[3]. This leads back to SDN controller interconnections and leaves a gap in the secure
communications on the control-layer.
Discussion: It is debatable whether the interconnection of the control-planes is
actually needed and beneficial in the presented abstraction model. It can be claimed
that the NFV datapath will be instantiated from the service management level and trigger
the network control layer configuration for each domain. This is true if the transport
layer tunnels the traffic. If it does not, every forwarding device needs to be aware of the
datapath and topology updates. Component topology also sets requirements for secure
channel separation for network control. ETSI is open to let the SDN component be run in
both a VNF (1), in the infrastructure domain (2) or in the VIM (3). In distributed models
such as intermediate or federated models, where network control is outsourced from the
datacenter, it is important to differentiate the network control traffic from the data-plane
and service control layer. This is to ensure separation of the different organizational roles
and different business roles for ISPs.
ETSI has no guidelines for interdomain communication on network control level, but
it can be interpreted that they consider this as service-management traffic that belongs to
the management layer. This conflicts with their statement about reliability and lack of
responsiveness on the management layer [6].
Service Management
The service Management layer is responsible for the lifecycle management of a Virtual
Network Function. This is comparable to the Management and Orchestration (MANO)
component in the ETSI model. This paper considers all MANO and VNFC-VNFC traffic
to be classified as service management traffic.
Interconnecting these components can be implemented by: standardization of
protocols (1) or implementation of an APIs such as overlay application or distributed
APIs (2). Additionally, the data attributes in the inter-domain communication need a
common description. Currently, this communication layer is not standardized and it has
no security guidelines. But, multiple research groups work on different models.
Protocol standardization: No standardized network protocol for this layer is found,
but IETF has suggested a NSH extension protocol [10]. Dataformat standardization
is currently a challenge for designing such protocols. Data format standardization
organizations such as: Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud Applications
(OASIS TOSCA) and TMforum Information Framework (SID), work specifically with the
portability of NFV services and are the leading standard aligned with the ETSI guidelines
[32].
Distributed API and overlays: The open-source community of OpenStack has an
Infrastructure-as-a-Service approach to the orchestration layer (HOT - Heat Orchestration
Templates) [18] and suggests using cascading of the OpenStack API. Extensions and
modifications of the OpenStack platform, such as OpenMANO and OPNFV, have
also suggested APIs for interconnection. Currently, the open-source environment runs
multisite projects [18], but the project has focused on federated models and not models
with interconnection between autonomous systems.
Discussion: Recent research [33] shows that interconnections on this layer have
functional challenges like lifecycle management, long processing time of both distribution
of state information and calculation of Service Graphs.
ETSI started the work on reliability in January 2015 [6] and reliability iscurrently
the area of most research. The dependencies between the orchestration components are
complex and difficult for operators to manage. This corresponds to the security challenge
associated with multiple secure channels between operators. In addition to model security,
this paper suggests using the presented security model to also be a basis for function
behaviour for interdomain communication interfaces. This would enable aggregation of
security policies and automation in the establishment of secure channels.
NFV domain-level
The NFV domain-level in the security model is a new representation of the contractual
top-level peering between two ISPs. This paper suggests that; when two ISPs want to use
NFV services from each other, they need to set up one top-level interconnection between
them. This channel can be used to configure a secure NFV domain relation, and should
ultimately contain all data needed to set up the underlying channels. Regarding security,
this layer should also be responsible for generating SAs for lower stack layers.
Discussion: There are examples of ISPs [34] that have made custom APIs for their
network, allowing customers to integrate with their API and set up network services
and peers on demand. These examples could also be considered as "standardization
suggestions" on a subordinate level such as the service management level, but are in
fact a top-level integration with no service or control channels. The disadvantage is that
this makes the application responsible for all network- and service-control. This does not
scale for NFV interconnections and makes the API integrations custom and complex.
Class Attributes Description
Abstraction
layer Sub class Research silo
Upper layer sup-
port
Isolation
sup-
port
Encryption
support
Security
chain
support
Technologies in class Researchstatus
Transport Cloud based net-working Cloud comp.
Yes, but no stan-
dard Yes Yes, IPsec Can have
OpenvSwitch+
GRE/IPSEC Implemented
Transport Additional Lay-ers Telco.
Yes, but no stan-
dard Yes Not yet Not yet NSH,MPLS Implemented
Transport Layer 2 intercon-nections
Datacenter net-
work
Yes, industry pro-
prietary some
No, need
tunnels No
VLAN, VXLAN, OTT,
NSX, NV-GRE, L2VPN Implemented
Transport Plain IP All No some Yes No IP+flowcontrol Not work-ing
Control SDN overlay Cloud comp. Yes, but no chain Yes Notknown
not
known
FORCES, ALTO, CDNI,
I2RS Implemented
Control SDN east-west Datacenter Yes, but no chain Yes Yes, ssland tunnel No OpenFlow, OPFlex ,SDNi Implemented
Control Specific Protocol All Yes, but no chain Canhave Can have No MPLS SR/PCE, new NSH
Ongoing
work
Control Custom Soft-wareControl All Yes, but no chain
Can
have
Yes, ssl
and tunnel No
OSVDB, PCRF,BNG, Net-
conf/Yang Not known
Control Abstracted API All Not relevant Canhave Can have Can have
(OSS/VIM, NorthB-SDN,
Custom)
Do not
scale
Service Protocol stan-darization Telco. No Not yet Not yet Not yet NSH, TOSCA, SID
No specifi-
cation
Service Overlay API Cloud comp. No Canhave
Yes, ssl
and tunnel No OpenStackAPI Implemented
Service Distributed API Cloud comp.,Datacenter No Not yet Not yet Not yet
OpenStackAPI, OPNNFV,
OpenMANO
Ongoing
project
NFV
domain NFV Application None Not relevant
Can
have Can have Can have
Industry proprietary (Colt,
NSX)
No specifi-
cation
Table 2: Summary of the NFV technology classification
7 Conclusion
Traditionally, end-to-end security is ensured by end-to-end network channels with
integrity and encryption. In NFV, there are more than two parties involved in the
communication, where the use of traditional end-to-end security methods results in
complex setups of network flows. We have created a model that shows there are network
security dependencies between the NFV components in a horizontal and vertical manner.
The model includes a new top-level integration point on domain-level, that opens up for
automation and simplification when deploying NFV interconnections between two ISPs.
The model is also used to classify the research and the NFV interconnection
technologies. The technologies have been evaluated with respect to isolation, encryption
and ability to communicate up, down sideways in the model. It is shown that the
current research silos do not have a common end-to-end security framework and that
most technologies lack integrity and encryption. This leaves a security gap in the ETSI
NFV model.
From autonomous systems, such as ISPs, NSH is the most promising transport
technology that can support the model, but it still lacks support for encryption, integrity
and control-layer protocols.
We have introduced a chain of Security Associations (SA) between the NFV
components as a possible solution to ensure end-to-end security. Due to lack of dynamics
in standard security frameworks, we suggest future work to focus on developing a
framework for automatic key distribution of SAs such as block-chains or key tokens [35].
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